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Abstract. This work aims to show the applicability, and how, of pri-
vacy by design approach to biometric systems and the benefit of using
formal methods to this end. Starting from a general framework that has
been introduced at STM in 2014, that enables to define privacy archi-
tectures and to formally reason about their properties, we explain how
it can be adapted to biometrics. The choice of particular techniques and
the role of the components (central server, secure module, biometric ter-
minal, smart card, etc.) in the architecture have a strong impact on the
privacy guarantees provided by a biometric system. In the literature,
some architectures have already been analysed in some way. However,
the existing proposals were made on a case by case basis, which makes
it difficult to compare them and to provide a rationale for the choice
of specific options. In this paper, we describe, on different architectures
with various levels of protection, how a general framework for the defi-
nition of privacy architectures can be used to specify the design options
of a biometric systems and to reason about them in a formal way.
1 Introduction
Applications of biometric recognition, as the most natural tool to identify or
to authenticate a person, have grew over the years. They now vary from crimi-
nal investigations and identity documents to many public or private usages, like
physical access control or authentication from a smartphone toward an internet
service provider. Such biometric systems involve two main phases: enrolment
and verification (either authentication or identification) [23]. Enrolment is the
registration phase, in which the biometric traits of a person are collected and
recorded within the system. In the authentication mode, a fresh biometric trait
is collected and compared with the registered one by the system to check that it
corresponds to the claimed identity. In the identification mode, a fresh biomet-
ric data is collected and the corresponding identity is searched in a database of
? This work has been partially funded by the French ANR-12-INSE-0013 project BIO-
PRIV and the European FP7-ICT-2013-1.5 project PRIPARE. Earlier and partial
versions of this work appeared in FM 2015 [10] and ISC 2015 [11] conferences. This
work provides a global and consistent view of these preliminary publications.
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enrolled biometric references. During each phase, to enable efficient and accu-
rate comparison, the collected biometric data are converted into discriminative
features, leading to what is called a biometric template.
With the increased use of biometric systems, and more recently with the
development of personal data protection regulations, the issues related to the
protection of the privacy of the used biometric traits have received particular
attention. As leakage of biometric traits may lead to privacy risks, including
tracking and identity theft, privacy by design approach is often needed.
As a security technical challenge, it has attracted a lot of research works
since at least 15 years and a wide-array of well-documented primitives, such
as encryption, homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation, hard-
ware security, template protection etc., are known in the litterature. With those
building tools, various architectures have been proposed to take into account
privacy requirements in the implementation of privacy preserving biometric sys-
tems. Some solutions involve dedicated cryptographic primitives such as secure
sketches [14] and fuzzy vaults [24,44], others rely on adaptations of existing
cryptographic tools [30] or the use of secure hardware solutions [36]. The choice
of particular techniques and the role of the components (central server, secure
module, terminal, smart card, etc.) in the architecture have a strong impact
on the privacy guarantees provided by a solution. However, existing proposals
were made on a case by case basis, which makes it difficult to compare them,
to provide a rationale for the choice of specific options and to capitalize on past
experience.
Here, we aim to show how to use and adapt a general framework that has been
introduced in [2] for the formal definition and validation of privacy architectures.
The goal is specify the various design options in a consistent and comparable
way, and then to reason about them in a formal way in order to justify their
design in terms of trust assumptions and achieved privacy properties.
The privacy by design approach is often praised by lawyers as well as com-
puter scientists as an essential step towards a better privacy protection. It is even
becoming more and more often legally compelled, as for instance in European
Union with the General Data Protection Regulation [16] entering into force.
Nevertheless, it is one thing to impose by law the adoption of privacy by design,
quite another to define precisely what it is intended to mean technically-wise
and to ensure that it is put into practice by developers. The overall philosophy
is that privacy should not be treated as an afterthought but rather as a first-class
requirement in the design phase of systems: in other words, designers should have
privacy in mind from the start when they define the features and architecture of
a system. However, the practical application raises a number of challenges: first
of all the privacy requirements must be defined precisely; then it must be possi-
ble to reason about potential tensions between privacy and other requirements
and to explore different combinations of privacy enhancing technologies to build
systems meeting all these requirements.
This work, which has been conducted in particular within the French ANR
research project BioPriv [6], an interdisciplinary project involving lawyers and
computer scientists, can be seen as an illustration of the feasibility of the privacy
by design approach in an industrial environment. A step in this direction has
been described in [2] which introduces a system for defining privacy architectures
and reasoning about their properties. In Section 2, we provide an outline of this
framework. Then we show how this framework can be used to apply a privacy
by design approach to the implementation of biometric systems. In Sections 3
to 4.3, we describe several architectures for biometric systems, considering both
existing systems and more advanced solutions, and show that they can be defined
in this framework. This makes it possible to highlight their commonalities and
differences especially with regard to their underlying trust assumptions.
In the second part of this paper, we address a security issue which cannot be
expressed in the framework presented in Section 2. The origin of the problem is
that side-channel information may leak from the execution of the system. This
issue is acute for biometric systems because the result of a matching between
two biometric data inherently provides some information, even if the underlying
cryptographic components are correctly implemented [12,39,37]. To adress this
issue, in Section 5, we propose an extension of the formal framework, in which
information leaks spanning over several sessions of the system can be expressed.
In Section 6, we apply the extended model to analyse biometric information
leakage in several variants of biometric system architectures.
Finally, Section 7 sketches related works and Section 8 concludes the paper
with suggestions of avenues for further work.
2 General approach
The work presented in [2] can be seen as a first step towards a formal and
systematic approach to privacy by design. In practice, this framework makes it
possible to express privacy and integrity requirements (typically the fact that an
entity must obtain guarantees about the correctness of a value), to analyse their
potential tensions and to make reasoned architectural choices based on explicit
trust assumptions. The motivations for the approach come from the following
observations:
– First, one of the key decisions that has to be taken in the design of a privacy
compliant system is the location of the data and the computations: for ex-
ample, a system in which all data is collected and all results computed on a
central server brings strong integrity guarantees to the operator at the price
of a loss of privacy for data subjects. Decentralized solutions may provide
better privacy protections but weaker guarantees for the operator. The use
of privacy enhancing technologies such as homomorphic encryption or secure
multi-party computation can in some cases reconcile both objectives.
– The choice among the architectural options should be guided by the as-
sumptions that can be placed by the actors on the other actors and on the
components of the architecture. This trust itself can be justified in different
ways (security protocol, secure or certified hardware, accredited third party,
etc.).
As far as the formal model is concerned, the framework proposed in [2] relies on
a dedicated epistemic logic. Indeed, because privacy is closely connected with
the notion of knowledge, epistemic logics [17] form an ideal basis to reason about
privacy properties but standard epistemic logics based on possible worlds seman-
tics suffer from a weakness (called “logical omniscience” [22]) which makes them
unsuitable in the context of privacy by design.
We assume that the functionality of the system is expressed as the computa-
tion of a set of equations Ω := {X = T} over a language Term of terms T defined
as follows, where c represents constants (c ∈ Const), X variables (X ∈ V ar)
and F functions (F ∈ Fun):
T ::= X | c | F (T1, . . . , Tn)
An architecture is defined by a set of components Ci, for i ∈ [1, N ], and a set A
of relations. The relations define the capacities of the components and the trust
assumptions. We use the following language to define the relations:
A ::= {R}
R ::= Hasi(X) | Receivei,j({St}, {X}) | ComputeG(X = T )
| V erifyi(St) | Trusti,j
St ::= Pro | Att Att ::= AttestG({Eq})
Pro ::= Proofi({P}) Eq ::= Pred(T1, . . . , Tm)
P ::= Att | Eq
The notation {Z} denotes a set of terms of category Z. Hasi(X) denotes the
fact that component Ci possesses (or is the origin of) the value of X, which may
correspond to situations in which X is stored on Ci or Ci is a sensor collecting
the value of X. In this paper we use the set of predicates Pred := {=,∈}.
ComputeG(X = T ) means that the set of components G can compute the term
T and assign its value to X and Trusti,j represents the fact that component
Ci trusts component Cj . Receivei,j({St}, {X}) means that Ci can receive the
values of variables in {X} together with the statements in {St} from Cj .
We consider two types of statements here, namely attestations: Attesti({Eq})
is the declaration by the component i that the properties in {Eq} hold; and
proofs: Proofi({P}) is the delivery by Ci of a set of proofs of properties. V erifyi
is the verification by component Ci of the corresponding statements (proof or
authenticity). In any case, the architecture level does not provide details on how
a verification is done. The verification of an attestation concerns the authenticity
of the statement only, not its truth that Ci may even not be able to carry out
itself. In practice, it could be the verification of a digital signature.
Graphical data flow representations can be derived from architectures ex-
pressed in this language. For the sake of readability, we use both notations in
the next sections.
The subset of the privacy logic used in this paper is the following dedicated
epistemic logic:
ϕ ::= Hasi(X) | Hasnonei (X) | Ki(Prop) | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
Prop ::= Pred(T1, . . . , Tn) | Prop1 ∧ Prop2
Hasi(X) and Has
none
i (X) denote the facts that component Ci respectively can
or cannot get the value of X. Ki denotes the epistemic knowledge following
the “deductive algorithmic knowledge” philosophy [17,38] that makes it possible
to avoid the logical omniscience problem. In this approach, the knowledge of a
component Ci is defined as the set of properties that this component can actually
derive using its own information and his deductive system .i.
Another relation, Depi, is used to take into account dependencies between
variables. Depi(Y,X ) means that if Ci can obtain the values of each variable in
the set of variables X , then it may be able to derive the value of Y . The absence
of such a relation is an assumption that Ci cannot derive the value of X from
the values of the variables in X . It should be noted that this dependency relation
is associated with a given component: different components may have different
capacities. For example, if component Ci is the only component able to decrypt
a variable ev to get the clear text v, then Depi(v, {ev}) holds but Depj(v, {ev})
does not hold for any j 6= i.
The semantics S(A) of an architecture A is defined as the set of states of
the components Ci of A resulting from compatible execution traces [2]. A com-
patible execution trace contains only events that are instantiations of relations
(e.g. Receivei,j , ComputeG, etc.) of A (as further discussed in Section 5.1). The
semantics S(ϕ) of a property ϕ is defined as the set of architectures meeting
ϕ. For example, A ∈ S(Hasnonei (X)) if for all states σ ∈ S(A), the sub-state
σi of component Ci is such that σi(X) = ⊥, which expresses the fact that the
component Ci cannot assign a value to the variable X.
To make it possible to reason about privacy properties, an axiomatics of this
logic is presented and is proven sound and complete. A ` ϕ denotes that ϕ can
be derived from A thanks to the deductive rules (i.e. there exists a derivation
tree such that all steps belong to the axiomatics, and such that the leaf is A ` ϕ).
A subset of the axioms useful for this paper is presented in Figure 1.
3 Biometric systems architectures
Before starting the presentation of the different biometric architectures in the
next sections, we introduce in this section the basic terminology used in this
paper and the common features of the architectures. For the sake of readability,
we use upper case sans serif letters S, T, etc. rather than indexed variables Ci to
denote components. By abuse of notation, we will use component names instead
of indices and write, for example, ReceiveU,T({}, {dec}). Type letters dec, br,
etc. denote variables. The set of components of an architecture is denoted by J .
The variables used in biometric system architectures are the following:
– A biometric reference template br built during the enrolment phase, where
a template corresponds to a set or vector of biometrics features that are
extracted from raw biometric data in order to be able to compare biometric
data accurately.
– A raw biometric data rd provided by the user during the verification phase.
Hasi(X) ∈ A
H1
A ` Hasi(X)
ComputeG(X = T ) ∈ A Ci ∈ G
H3
A ` Hasi(X)
Receivei,j(S,E) ∈ A X ∈ E
H2
A ` Hasi(X)
Depi(Y,X ) ∀X ∈ X , A ` Hasi(X)
H5
A ` Hasi(Y )
A 0 Hasi(X)
HN
A ` Hasnonei (X)
E .i Eq0 ∀Eq ∈ E : A ` Ki(Eq)
K.
A ` Ki(Eq0)
ComputeG(X = T ) ∈ A Ci ∈ G
K1
A ` Ki(X = T )
V erifyi(Proofj(E)) ∈ A Eq ∈ E
K3
A ` Ki(Eq)
V erifyi(Proofj(E)) ∈ A Attestk(E′) ∈ E Eq ∈ E′ Trusti,k ∈ A
K4
A ` Ki(Eq)
V erifyi(Attestj(E)) ∈ A Trusti,j ∈ A Eq ∈ E
K5
A ` Ki(Eq)
Fig. 1. A subset of rules from the axiomatics of [2]
– A fresh template bs derived from rd during the verification phase.
– A threshold thr which is used during the verification phase as a closeness
criterion for the biometric templates.
– The output dec of the verification which is the result of the matching be-
tween the fresh template bs and the enrolled templates br, considering the
threshold thr.
Two components appear in all biometric architectures: a component U repre-
senting the user, and the terminal T which is equipped with a sensor used to
acquire biometric traits. In addition, biometric architectures may involve an ex-
plicit issuer I, enrolling users and certifying their templates, a server S managing
a database containing enrolled templates, a module (which can be a hardware
security module, denoted HSM) to perform the matching and eventually to take
the decision, and a smart card C to store the enrolled templates (and in some
cases to perform the matching). Figure 2 introduces some graphical representa-
tions used in the figures of this paper.
User Encrypted
database
Terminal Card
Location
of the
comparison
Fig. 2. Graphical representations
In this paper, we focus on the verification phase and assume that enrolment
has already been done. Therefore the biometric reference templates are stored
on a component which can be either the issuer (HasI(br)) or a smart card
(HasC(br)). A verification process is initiated by the terminal T receiving as
input a raw biometric data rd from the user U. T extracts the fresh biometric
template bs from rd using the function Extract ∈ Fun. All architectures A
therefore include ReceiveT,U({}, {rd}) and ComputeT(bs = Extract(rd)) and
the DepT relation is such that (bs, {rd}) ∈ DepT. In all architectures A, the
user receives the final decision dec (which can typically be positive or negative)
from the terminal: ReceiveU,T({}, {dec}) ∈ A. The matching itself, which can be
performed by different components depending on the architecture, is expressed
by the function µ ∈ Fun which takes as arguments two biometric templates and
the threshold thr.
4 Application of the framework to several architectures
for biometric systems with various protection levels
4.1 Protecting the reference templates with encryption
Let us consider first the most common architecture deployed for protecting bio-
metric data. When a user is enrolled his reference template is stored encrypted,
either in a terminal with an embedded database, or in a central database. Dur-
ing the identification process, the user supplies a fresh template, the reference
templates are decrypted by a component (which can be typically the terminal
or a dedicated hardware security module) and the comparison is done inside
this component. The first part of Figure 3 shows an architecture Aed in which
reference templates are stored in a central database and the decryption of the
references and the matching are done inside the terminal. The second part of
the figure shows an architecture Ahsm in which the decryption of the references
and the matching are done on a dedicated hardware security module. Both ar-
chitectures are considered in turn in the following paragraphs.
Use of an encrypted database. The first architecture Aed is composed of a
user U, a terminal T, a server S managing an encrypted database ebr and an
issuer I enrolling users and generating the encrypted database ebr. The set Fun
includes the encryption and decryption functions Enc and Dec. When applied
to an array, Enc is assumed to encrypt each entry of the array. At this stage,
for the sake of conciseness, we consider only biometric data in the context of
an identification phase. The same types of architectures can be used to deal
with authentication, which does not raise any specific issue. The functionality of
the architecture is Ω := {ebr = Enc(br), br′ = Dec(ebr), bs = Extract(rd),
dec = µ(br′, bs, thr)}, and the architecture is defined as:
Aed :=
{
HasI(br), HasU(rd), HasT(thr), ComputeI(ebr = Enc(br)),
ReceiveS,I({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}),
Urd
dec
T
rd→ bs
thr
ebr
S
ebr
I
br→ ebr
Encrypted database
U
rd
dec
T
rd→ bs
bs, ebr
dec
M
thr
ebr
S
ebr
I
br→ ebr
Encrypted database with a hardware security module (HSM)
Fig. 3. Classical architectures with an encrypted database
ReceiveT,S({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}), T rustT,I,
V erifyT(AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))), ReceiveT,U({}, {rd}),
ComputeT(bs = Extract(rd)), ComputeT(br
′ = Dec(ebr)),
ComputeT(dec = µ(br
′, bs, thr)), ReceiveU,T({}, {dec})
}
The properties of the encryption scheme are captured by the dependence and
deductive relations. The dependence relations are: (ebr, {br}) ∈ DepI, and {(bs,
{rd}), (dec, {br′, bs, thr}), (br′, {ebr}), (br, {ebr})} ⊆ DepT. Moreover the
deductive algorithm relation contains: {ebr = Enc(br)} . {br = Dec(ebr)}.
From the point of view of biometric data protection, the property that this
architecture is meant to ensure is the fact that the server should not have access
to the reference template, that is to say: HasnoneS (br), which can be proven using
Rule HN (the same property holds for br′):
HasS(br) 6∈ Aed @X : (br,X ) ∈ DepS @T : ComputeS(br = T ) ∈ Aed
@j ∈ J ,@S, @E,ReceiveS,j(S,E) ∈ Aed ∧ br ∈ E
HN
Aed ` HasnoneS (br)
It is also easy to prove, using H2 and H5, that the terminal has access to br′:
HasT(br
′).
As far as integrity is concerned, the terminal should be convinced that the
matching is correct. The proof relies on the trust placed by the terminal in the
issuer (about the correctness of ebr) and the computations that the terminal
can perform by itself (through ComputeT and the application of .):
V erifyT({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}) ∈ Aed TrustT,I ∈ Aed
K5
Aed ` KT(ebr = Enc(br))
{ebr = Enc(br)} . {br = Dec(ebr)} Aed ` KT(ebr = Enc(br))
K.
Aed ` KT(br = Dec(ebr))
ComputeT(br
′ = Dec(ebr)) ∈ Aed
K1
Aed ` KT(br′ = Dec(ebr))
Assuming that all deductive relations include the properties (commutativity and
transitivity) of the equality, K. can be used to derive: Aed ` KT(br = br′). A
further application of K1 with another transitivity rule for the equality allows
us to obtain the desired integrity property:
Aed ` KT(br = br′)
ComputeT(dec = µ(br
′, bs, thr)) ∈ Aed
K1
Aed ` KT(dec = µ(br′, bs, thr))
K.
Aed ` KT(dec = µ(br, bs, thr))
Encrypted database with a hardware security module. The architecture
presented in the previous subsection relies on the terminal to decrypt the ref-
erence template and to perform the matching operation. As a result, the clear
reference template is known by the terminal and the only component that has to
be trusted by the terminal is the issuer. If it does not seem sensible to entrust the
terminal with this central role, another option is to delegate the decryption of
the reference template and computation of the matching to a hardware security
module so that the terminal itself never stores any clear reference template. This
strategy leads to architecture Ahsm pictured in the second part of Figure 3.
In addition to the user U, the issuer I, the terminal T, and the server S, the set
of components contains a hardware security module M. The terminal does not
perform the matching, but has to trust M. This trust can be justified in practice
by the level of security provided by the HSM M (which can also be endorsed by
an official security certification scheme). The architecture is described as follows
in our framework:
Ahsm :=
{
HasI(br), HasU(rd), HasM(thr), ComputeI(ebr = Enc(br)),
ReceiveS,I({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}),
ReceiveT,S({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}), T rustT,I,
V erifyT(AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))), ReceiveT,U({}, {rd}),
ComputeT(bs = Extract(rd)), ReceiveM,T({}, {bs, ebr}),
ComputeM(br
′ = Dec(ebr)), ComputeM(dec = µ(br′, bs, thr)),
V erifyT({AttestM(dec = µ(br′, bs, thr))}), T rustT,M,
ReceiveT,M(A, {dec}), V erifyT({AttestM(br′ = Dec(ebr))})
}
where the set of attestations A received by the terminal from the module is
A := {AttestM(dec = µ(br′, bs, thr)), AttestM(br′ = Dec(ebr))}.
The trust relation between the terminal and the module makes it possible to
apply rule K5 twice:
V erifyT({AttestM(dec = µ(br′, bs, thr))}) ∈ Ahsm TrustT,M ∈ Ahsm
Ahsm ` KT(dec = µ(br′, bs, thr))
V erifyT({AttestM(br′ = Dec(ebr))}) ∈ Ahsm TrustT,M ∈ Ahsm
K5
Ahsm ` KT(br′ = Dec(ebr))
The same proof as in the previous subsection can be applied to establish the
integrity of the matching. The trust relation between the terminal and the issuer
and the rules K5, K. make it possible to derive: Ahsm ` KT(br = Dec(ebr)). Then
two successive applications of K. regarding the transitivity of the equality lead
to: Ahsm ` KT(dec = µ(br, bs, thr)).
As in architecture Aed, the biometric references are never disclosed to the
server. However, in contrast with Aed, they are not disclosed either to the ter-
minal, as shown by rule HN:
HasT(br) 6∈ Ahsm @X : (br,X ) ∈ DepT @T : ComputeT(br = T ) ∈ Ahsm
@j ∈ J ,@S,@E,ReceiveT,j(S,E) ∈ Ahsm ∧ br ∈ E
HN
Ahsm ` HasnoneT (br)
4.2 Enhancing protection with homomorphic encryption
In both architectures of Section 4.1, biometric templates are protected, but the
component performing the matching (either the terminal or the secure module)
gets access to the reference templates. In this section, we show how homomorphic
encryption can be used to ensure that no component gets access to the biometric
reference templates during the verification.
Homomorphic encryption schemes [19] makes it possible to compute certain
functions over encrypted data. For example, if Enc is a homomorphic encryption
scheme for multiplication then there is an operation ⊗ such that:
c1 = Enc(m1) ∧ c2 = Enc(m2)⇒ c1 ⊗ c2 = Enc(m1 ×m2).
Figure 4 presents an architecture Ahom derived from Ahsm in which the server
performs the whole matching computation over encrypted data. The user sup-
plies a template that is sent encrypted to the server (denoted ebs). The server
also owns an encrypted reference template ebr. The comparison, i.e. the com-
putation of the distance between the templates, is done by the server, leading to
the encrypted distance edec, but the server does not get access to the biometric
data or to the result. This is made possible through the use a homomorphic
encryption scheme. On the other hand, the module gets the result, but does not
get access to the templates. Let us note that Ahom is just one of the possible ways
to use homomorphic encryption in this context: the homomorphic computation
of the distance could actually be made by another component (for example the
terminal itself) since it does not lead to any leak of biometric data.
Urd
dec
T
rd→ bs
bs→ ebs
edec
dec
M
edec→ dec
ebs
edec
S
thr ebr
I
br→ ebr
Fig. 4. Comparison over encrypted data with homomorphic encryption
The homomorphic property of the encryption scheme needed for this appli-
cation depends on the matching algorithm. An option is to resort to a fully
homomorphic encryption scheme (FHE) [19] as in the solution described in [43]
which uses a variant of a FHE scheme for face-recognition. However, schemes
with simpler homomorphic functionalities can also be sufficient (examples can
be found in [8,7]). Since we describe our solutions at the architecture level, we
do not need to enter into details regarding the chosen homomorphic scheme. We
just need to assume the existence of a homomorphic matching function Hom-µ
with the following properties captured by the algorithmic knowledge relations:
{ebr = Enc(br), ebs = Enc(bs),
edec = Hom-µ(ebr, ebs, thr)} . {Dec(edec) = µ(br, bs, thr)} (1)
The dependence relations include the following: {(bs, {rd}), (ebs, {bs})} ⊆
DepT; (ebr, {br}) ∈ DepI; {(br, {ebr}), (bs, {ebs}), (dec, {edec})} ⊆ DepM.
Architecture Ahom is defined as follows:
Ahom :=
{
HasI(br), HasU(rd), HasS(thr), ComputeI(ebr = Enc(br)),
ReceiveS,I({AttestI({ebr = Enc(br)})}, {ebr}), ReceiveT,U({}, {rd}),
ComputeT(bs = Extract(rd)), ComputeT(ebs = Enc(bs)),
ReceiveS,T({}, {ebs}), ComputeS(edec = Hom-µ(ebr, ebs, thr)),
ReceiveT,S(A, {edec}), V erifyT(AttestI({ebr = Enc(br)})),
V erifyT(AttestS({edec = Hom-µ(ebr, ebs, thr)})), T rustT,S,
T rustT,I, ReceiveM,T({}, {edec}), ComputeM(dec = Dec(edec)),
ReceiveT,M({AttestM({dec = Dec(edec)})}, {dec}), T rustT,M,
V erifyT(AttestM({dec = Dec(edec)})), ReceiveU,T({}, {dec})
}
where the set A of attestations received by the terminal from the server is:
A := {AttestI({ebr = Enc(br)}), AttestS({edec = Hom-µ(ebr, ebs, thr)})}.
In order to prove that the terminal can establish the integrity of the result
dec, we can proceed in two steps, proving first the correctness of edec and then
deriving the correctness of edec using the properties of homomorphic encryption.
The first step relies on the capacities of component T and the trust assumptions
on components I and S using rules K1 and K5 respectively.
ComputeT(ebs = Enc(bs)) ∈ Ahom
K1
Ahom ` KT(ebs = Enc(bs))
V erifyT({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}) ∈ Ahom TrustT,I ∈ Ahom
K5
Ahom ` KT(ebr = Enc(br))
V erifyT({AttestS(edec = Hom-µ(br, bs, thr))}), TrustT,S ∈ Ahom
K5
Ahom ` KT(edec = Hom-µ(br, bs, thr))
The second step can be done through the application of the deductive algorithmic
knowledge regarding the homomorphic encryption property (with LHS1 the left
hand-side of equation (1)) :
LHS1 . {Dec(edec) = µ(br, bs, thr)} ∀Eq ∈ LHS1 : Ahom ` KT(Eq)
K.
Ahom ` KT(Dec(edec) = µ(br, bs, thr))
The desired property is obtained through the application of rules K5 and K.
exploiting the trust relation between T and M and the transitivity of equality.
V erifyT({AttestM(dec = Dec(edec))}) ∈ Ahom TrustT,M ∈ Ahom
K5
Ahom ` KT(dec = Dec(edec))
Ahom ` KT(Dec(edec) = µ(br, bs, thr)) Ahom ` KT(dec = Dec(edec))
K.
Ahom ` KT(dec = µ(br, bs, thr))
As far as privacy is concerned, the main property that Ahom is meant to ensure
is that no component (except the issuer) has access to the biometric references.
Rule HN makes it possible to prove that U, T, and S never get access to br, as
in Section 4.1. The same rule can be applied here to prove Ahom 0 HasM(ebr)
exploiting the fact that neither (br, {edec}) nor (br, {dec}) belong to DepM.
4.3 The Match-On-Card technology
Another solution can be considered when the purpose of the system is authen-
tication rather than identification. In this case, it is not necessary to store a
database of biometric reference templates and a (usually unique) reference tem-
plate can be stored on a smart card. A smart card based privacy preserving
architecture has been proposed recently which relies on the idea of using the
card not only to store the reference template but also to perform the matching
itself. Since the comparison is done inside the card the reference template never
leaves the card. In this Match-On-Card (MOC) technology [36,35,20] (also called
comparison-on-card), the smart card receives the fresh biometric template, car-
ries out the comparison with its reference template, and sends the decision back
(as illustrated in Figure 5).
In this architecture, the terminal is assumed to trust the smart card. This
trust assumption is justified by the fact that the card is a tamper-resistant
hardware element. This architecture is simpler than the previous ones but not
always possible in practice (for a combination of technical and economic reasons)
U T C
rd
dec
rd→ bs
bs
dec
br
thr
Fig. 5. Biometric verification using the Match-On-Card technology
and may represent a shift in terms of trust if the smart card is under the control
of the user.
More formally, the MOC architecture is composed of a user U, a terminal T,
and a card C. The card C attests that the templates br and bs are close (with
respect to the threshold thr):
Amoc :=
{
HasC(br), HasU(rd), HasC(thr), ReceiveT,U({}, {rd}),
ComputeT(bs = Extract(rd)), ReceiveC,T({}, {bs}),
ComputeC(dec = µ(br, bs, thr)), ReceiveU,T({}, {dec}),
ReceiveT,C({AttestC(dec = µ(br, bs, thr))}, {dec}),
V erifyT({AttestC(dec = µ(br, bs, thr))}), T rustT,C
}
Using rule HN, it is easy to show that no component apart from C gets access
to br. The proof of the integrity property relies on the capacities of component
T and the trust assumption on component C using rules K1 and K5 respectively.
5 Extension of the framework to information leakage
5.1 Extension of the architecture language
Motivated by the need to analyse the inherent leakage of the result of a match-
ing between two biometric data in biometric systems (cf. [12,39,37]), we now
propose an extension of the formal framework sketched in Section 2, in which
the information leaking through several executions can be expressed.
We highlights the difference with the framework introduced in Section 2
without repeating their common part. The term language we use is now the
following.
T ::= X˜ | c | F (X˜1, . . . , X˜m, c1, . . . , cq)
X˜ ::= X | X[k]
Functions may take as parameters both variables and constants. Variables X˜ can
be simple variables or arrays of variables. If X is an array, Range(X) denotes
its size.
In this extended framework, in addition to defining a set of primitives, an
architecture can also provide a bound on the number of times a primitive can
be used.
A ::= {R}
R ::= Has
(n)
i (X) | Hasi(c) | Receive(n)i,j ({St}, {X} ∪ {c})
| Trusti,j | Reset | Compute(n)G (X = T ) | V erify(n)i ({St})
St ::= Pro | Att Att ::= Attesti({Eq})
Pro ::= Proofi({P}) Eq ::= Pred(T1, . . . , Tm)
P ::= Att | Eq
The superscript notation (n) denotes that a primitive can be carried out at most
n ∈ (N \ {0}) ∪ {∞} times by the component(s) – where (∀n′ ∈ N: n′ < ∞).
We assume that n is never equal to 0. mul(α) denotes the multiplicity (n) of the
primitive α, if any. The Reset primitive is used to reinitialize the whole system.
As in the initial model, consistency assumptions are made about the archi-
tectures to avoid meaningless definitions. For instance, we require that compo-
nents carry out computations only on the values that they have access to (either
through Has, Compute, or Receive). We also require that all multiplicities n
specified by the primitives are identical in a consistent architecture. As a result,
a consistent architecture A is parametrized by an integer n ≥ 1 (we note A(n)
when we want to make this integer explicit).
A key concept for the definition of the semantics is the notion of trace. A
trace is a sequence of events and an event4 is an instantiation of an architec-
tural primitive5. The notion of successive sessions is caught by the addition of
a Session event6 . A trace θ of events is said compatible with a consistent ar-
chitecture A(n) if all events in θ (except the computations) can be obtained
by instantiation of some architectural primitive from A, and if the number of
events between two Reset events corresponding to a given primitive is less than
the bound n specified by the architecture. We denote by T (A) the set of traces
which are compatible with an architecture A.
θ ::= Seq()
 ::= Hasi(X : V ) | Hasi(c) | Receivei,j({St}, {X : V } ∪ {c})
| Session | Reset | ComputeG(X = T ) | V erifyi({St})
An event can instantiate variables X with specific values V . Constants always
map to the same value. Let V al be the set of values the variables and constants
can take. The set V al⊥ is defined as V al ∪ {⊥} where ⊥ 6∈ V al is a specific
symbol used to denote that a variable or a constant has not been assigned yet.
4 Except for the Session event.
5 Except for Trust primitives, which cannot be instantiated into events because they
are global assumptions.
6 Computations can involve different values of the same variables from different ses-
sions.
The semantics of an architecture follows the approach introduced in [2]. Each
component is associated with a state. Each event in a trace of events affects the
state of each component involved by the event. The semantics of an architecture
is defined as the set of states reachable by compatible traces.
The state of a component is either the Error state or a pair consisting of: (i)
a variable state assigning values to variables, and (ii) a property state defining
what is known by a component.
State⊥ = (StateV × StateP ) ∪ {Error}
StateV = V ar ∪ Const→ List(V al⊥)
StateP = {Eq} ∪ {Trusti,j}
The data structure List over a set S denotes the finite ordered lists of elements
of S, size(L) denotes the size of the list L, and () is the empty list. For a non-
empty list L = (e1, . . . , en) ∈ Sn where size(L) = n ≥ 1, L[m] denotes the
element em for 1 ≤ m ≤ n, last(L) denotes L[n], and append(L, e) denotes the
list (e1, . . . , en, e) ∈ Sn+1. Let σ := (σ1, . . . , σN ) denote the global state (i.e. the
list of states of all components) defined over (State⊥)N and σvi and σ
pk
i denote,
respectively, the variable and the knowledge state of the component Ci.
The variable state assigns values to variables and to constants (each constant
is either undefined or taking a single value). σvi (X)[m] (resp. σ
v
i (c)[m]) denotes
the m-th entry of the variable state of X ∈ V ar (resp. c ∈ Const). The initial
state of an architecture A is denoted by InitA = 〈InitA1 , . . . , InitAN 〉 where: ∀Ci:
InitAi = (Empty, {Trusti,j | ∃Cj : Trusti,j ∈ A}). Empty associates to each
variable and constant a list made of a single undefined value (⊥). We assume
that, in the initial state, the system is in its first session. Alternatively, we could
set empty lists in the initial state and assume that every consistent trace begins
with a Session event.
Let ST : Trace × (State⊥)N → (State⊥)N and SE : Event × (State⊥)N →
(State⊥)N be the following two functions. ST is defined recursively by iteration of
SE : for all state σ ∈ (State⊥)N , event  ∈ Event and consistent trace θ ∈ Trace,
ST (〈〉, σ) = σ and ST ( · θ, σ) = ST (θ, SE(, σ)). The modification of a state is
noted σ[σi/(v, pk)] the variable and knowledge states of Ci are replaced by v
and pk respectively. σ[σi/Error] denotes that the Error state is reached for
component Ci. We assume that a component reaching an Error state no longer
gets involved in any later action (until a reset of the system). The function SE
is defined event per event.
The effect of Hasi(X : V ) and Receivei,j(S, {(X : V )}) on the variable state
of component Ci is the replacement of the last value of the variable X by the
value V : last(σvi (X)) := V . This effect is denoted by σ
v
i [X/V ]:
SE(Hasi(X : V ), σ) = SE(Receivei,j(S, {X : V }), σ) = σ[σi/(σvi [X/V ], σpki )].
In the case of constants, the value V is determined by the interpretation of c (as
in the function symbols in the computation).
The effect of ComputeG(X = T ) is to assign to X, for each component
Ci ∈ G, the value V produces by the evaluation (denoted ε) of T . The new
knowledge is the equation X = T . A computation may involve values of variables
from different sessions. As a result, some consistency conditions must be met,
otherwise an error state is reached:
SE(ComputeG(X = T ), σ) =

σ[∀Ci ∈ G : σi/(σvi [X/V ], σpki ∪ {X = T})]
if the condition on the computation holds,
σ[σi/Error] otherwise,
where V := ε (T,∪Ci∈Gσvi ). For each X˜(n) ∈ T , the evaluation of T is done with
respect to the n last values of X˜ that are fully defined. An error state is reached
if n such values are not available. The condition on the computation is then:
∀Ci ∈ G, X˜(n) ∈ T : size
({
m
∣∣ σvi (V (X˜))[m] is fully defined}) ≥ n.
Semantics of the verification events are defined according to the (implicit)
semantics of the underlying verification procedures. In each case, the knowl-
edge state of the component is updated if the verification passes, otherwise the
component reaches an Error state. The variable state is not affected.
SE(V erifyi(Proofj(E)), σ) =

σ[σi/(σ
v
i , σ
pk
i ∪ newpkProof )]
if the proof is valid,
σ[σi/Error] otherwise,
SE(V erifyi(Attestj(E)), σ) =

σ[σi/(σ
v
i , σ
pk
i ∪ newpkAttest)]
if the attestation is valid,
σ[σi/Error] otherwise.
The new knowledge newpkProof and new
pk
Attest are defined as:
newpkProof :=
{
Eq
∣∣∣∣ Eq ∈ E ∨ (∃Ck : Attestk(E′) ∈ E ∧ Eq ∈ E′∧ Trusti,k ∈ σpki
)}
and
newpkAttest := {Eq | Eq ∈ E ∧ Trusti,j ∈ σpki }.
In the session case, the knowledge state is reinitialized and a new entry is added
in the variable states:
SE(Session, σ) = σ[∀i : σi/(updv, {Trusti,j | ∃Cj : Trusti,j ∈ A})],
where the new variable state updv is such that σvi (X) := append(σ
v
i (X),⊥) for
all variables X ∈ V ar, and σvi (c) := append(σvi (c), last(σvi (c))) for all constants
c ∈ Const. The session event is not local to a component, all component states
are updated. As a result, we associate to each global state σ a unique number,
noted s(σ), which indicates the number of sessions. In the initial state, s(σ) := 1,
and at each Session event, s(σ) is incremented.
In the reset case, all values are dropped and the initial state is restored:
SE(Reset, σ) = Init
A.
This ends the definition of the semantics of trace of events. The semantics
S(A) of an architecture A is defined as the set of states reachable by compatible
traces.
5.2 Extension of the privacy logic
The privacy logic is enhanced to express access to n values of a given variable.
The formula Hasi represents n ≥ 1 accesses by Ci to some variable X.
ϕ ::= Hasi(X
(n)) | Hasi(c) | Hasnonei (X) | Hasnonei (c) | Ki(Eq) | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
Eq ::= Pred(T1, . . . , Tm)
Several values of the same variables from different sessions can provide informa-
tion about other variables, which is expressed through the dependence relation.
The semantics S(ϕ) of a property ϕ ∈ LP remains defined as the set of
architectures where ϕ is satisfied. The fact that ϕ is satisfied by a (consistent)
architecture A is defined as follows.
– A satisfies Hasi(X
(n)) if there is a reachable state in which X is fully defined
(at least) n ≥ 1 times.
– A satisfies Hasi(c) if there is a reachable state in which c is fully defined.
– A satisfies Hasnonei (X) (resp. Has
none
i (c)) if no compatible trace leads to a
state in which Ci assigns a value to X (resp. c).
– A satisfies Ki(Eq) if for all reachable states, there exists a state in the same
session in which Ci can derive Eq.
– A satisfies ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if A satisfies ϕ1 and A satisfies ϕ2.
A set of deductive rules for this privacy logic is given in Figure 6. One can
show that this axiomatics is sound and complete with respect to the semantics
above. The soundness theorem states that for all A, if A ` ϕ, then A ∈ S(ϕ).
Completeness means that for all A, if A ∈ S(ϕ) then A ` ϕ.
Due to the length of the proofs and the lack of place, we only give sketch
for these proofs. Soundness is proved by induction on the derivation tree. For
each theorem A ` ϕ, one can find traces satisfying the claimed property, or
show that all traces satisfy the claimed property (depending on the kind of
property). Completeness is shown by induction on the property ϕ. For each
property belonging to the semantics, one can exhibit a tree that derives it from
the architecture.
A trace is said to be a covering trace if it contains an event corresponding to
each primitive specified in an architecture A (except trust relations) and if for
each primitive it contains as much events as the multiplicity (n) of the primitive.
As a first step to prove soundness, it is shown that for all consistent architecture
A, there exists a consistent trace θ ∈ T (A) that covers A.
Then the soundness is shown by induction on the depth of the tree A ` ϕ.
– Let us assume that A ` Hasi(X(n)), and that the derivation tree is of
depth 1. By definition of D, such a proof is obtained by application of (H1),
(H2) or (H3). In each case, it is shown (thanks to the existence of covering
traces) that an appropriate trace can be found in the semantics of A, hence
A ∈ S(Hasi(X(n))). The case of A ` Hasi(c) is very similar.
Has
(n)
i (X) ∈ A
H1
A ` Hasi(X(n))
Receive
(n)
i,j (S,E) ∈ A X ∈ E
H2
A ` Hasi(X(n))
A 0 Hasi(X(1))
HN
A ` Hasnonei (X)
Hasi(c) ∈ A
H1’
A ` Hasi(c)
Receive
(n)
i,j (S,E) ∈ A c ∈ E
H2’
A ` Hasi(c)
A 0 Hasi(c)
HN’
A ` Hasnonei (c)
Compute
(n)
G (X = T ) ∈ A Ci ∈ G
H3
A ` Hasi(X(n))
A ` Hasi(X(n)) 1 ≤ m ≤ n
H4
A ` Hasi(X(m))
Depi(Y,X ) ∀X(n) ∈ X : A ` Hasi(X(n)) ∀c ∈ X : A ` Hasi(c)
H5
A ` Hasi(Y (1))
Depi(c,X ) ∀X(n) ∈ X : A ` Hasi(X(n)) ∀c′ ∈ X : A ` Hasi(c′)
H5’
A ` Hasi(c)
Compute
(n)
G (X = T ) ∈ A Ci ∈ G
K1
A ` Ki(X = T )
A ` ϕ1 A ` ϕ2
I∧
A ` ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
E .i Eq0 ∀Eq ∈ E: A ` Ki(Eq)
K.
A ` Ki(Eq0)
A ` Ki(Eq1) A ` Ki(Eq2)
K∧
A ` Ki(Eq1 ∧ Eq2)
V erify
(n)
i (Proofj(E)) ∈ A Eq ∈ E
K3
A ` Ki(Eq)
V erify
(n)
i (Proofj(E)) ∈ A Attestk(E′) ∈ E Eq ∈ E′ Trusti,k ∈ A
K4
A ` Ki(Eq)
V erify
(n)
i (Attestj(E)) ∈ A Trusti,j ∈ A Eq ∈ E
K5
A ` Ki(Eq)
Fig. 6. Set of deductive rules for the extended privacy logic
– Let us assume that A ` Ki(Eq), and that the derivation tree is of depth 1.
By definition of D, such a proof is obtained by application of (K1), (K2),
(K3), (K4) or (K5). In each case, starting from a state σ′ ∈ Si(A) such that
s(σ′) ≥ n, it is first shown that there exists a covering trace θ ≥ θ′ that
extends θ′ and that contains n corresponding events ComputeG(X = T ) ∈ θ
in n distinct sessions (for the K1 case, and other events for the other rules).
Then by the properties of the deductive algorithmic knowledge, it is shown
that the semantics of the property A ∈ S(Ki(X = T )) holds.
– Let us assume that A ` Hasi(X(n)), and that the derivation tree is of
depth strictly greater than 1. By definition of D, such a proof is obtained by
application of (H4) or (H5).
In the first case, by the induction hypothesis and the semantics of prop-
erties, there exists a reachable state σ ∈ S(A) and n indices i1, . . . , in
such that σvi (X)[il] is fully defined for all l ∈ [1, n]. This gives, a fortiori,
A ∈ S(Hasi(X(m))) for all m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
In the second case, we have that (Y, {X(n1)1 , . . . , X(nm)m , c1, . . . , cq}) ∈ Depi,
that ∀l ∈ [1,m] : A ` Hasi(X(nl)l ) and ∀l ∈ [1, q] : A ` Hasi(cl). The proof
shows the existence of a covering trace that contains an event ComputeG (Y
= T ) (where i ∈ G), allowing to conclude that A ∈ S(Hasi(Y (1))).
Again, the corresponding cases for constant are very similar.
– A derivation for Hasnone is obtained by application of (HN). The proof
assume, towards a contradiction, that A 6∈ S(Hasnonei (X)). It is shown, by
the architecture semantics, that there exists a compatible trace that enable
to derive A ` Has(1)i (X). However, since (HN) was applied, we have A 0
Has
(1)
i (X), hence a contradiction.
– The last case (the conjunction ∧) is fairly straightforward.
The completeness is proved by induction over the definition of ϕ.
– Let us assume that A ∈ S(Hasi(X(n))). By the architecture semantics and
the semantics of traces, it is shown that the corresponding traces either
contain events where X is computed, received or measured, or that some
dependence relation on X exists. In the first case, we have A ` Hasi(X(n))
by applying (respectively) (H1), (H2), or (H3) (after an eventual application
of (H4)). In the last case, the proof shows how to exhibit a derivation tree
to obtain A ` Hasi(X(n)) (the (H5) rule is used).
– Let us assume that A ∈ S(Hasnonei (X)). By the semantics of properties,
this means that in all reachable states, X does not receive any value. The
proof shows that A 0 S(Hasi(X(1))), otherwise A ∈ S(Hasnonei (X)) would
be contradicted. So as a conclusion, A ` Hasnonei (X) by applying (HN).
– The constant cases A ∈ S(Hasi(c) and A ∈ S(Hasnonei (c)) case are similar
to the variable cases.
– Let us assume that A ∈ S(Ki(Eq)). By the semantics of properties this
means that for all reachable states, there exists a later state in the same
session where the knowledge state enables to derive Eq. By the semantics of
architecture, we can exhibit a compatible trace that reaches a state where
Eq can be derived. By the semantics of compatible traces, the proof shows,
by reasoning on the events on the traces, that A ` Ki(Eq) by applying either
(K1), (K2), (K3), (K4) or (K5).
– Finally the conjunctive case is straightforward.
6 Extension of the Match-On-Card to the identification
paradigm
We now show of the extended framework can be used to reason about the privacy
properties of a biometric system where some information leaks after several
sessions of the same protocol.
The biometric system introduced in [9] aims at extending the MOC tech-
nology (cf. Section 4.3) to the identification paradigm. A quantized version –
corresponding to short binary representations of the templates – of the database
is stored inside a secure module, playing the role of the card in the MOC case.
From each biometric reference template, a quantization is computed, using typ-
ically a secure sketch scheme [25,14]. The reference database is encrypted and
stored outside the secure module, whereas the quantizations of the templates
are stored inside.
The verification step is processed as follows. Suppose one wants to identify
himself in the system. A terminal captures the fresh biometrics, extracts a tem-
plate, computes its quantization qs and sends them to the secure module. Then,
the module proceeds to a comparison between the fresh quantization and all
enrolled quantizations qr. The c nearest quantizations, for some parameter c
of the system, are the c potential candidates for the identification. Then, the
module queries the c corresponding (encrypted) templates to the database (by
using the list of indices ind of those c nearest quantized versions qr of the en-
rolled templates). This gives the module the access to the set sebr of the c
encrypted templates. The module decrypts them, and compares them with the
fresh template bs. The module finally sends its response to the terminal: 1 if
one of the enrolled templates is close enough to the fresh template, 0 otherwise.
Figure 7 gives a graphical representation of the resulting architecture.
U
rd
dec
T
rd→ bs
bs→ qs
ebr → sebr
ind qs
ind
bs, sebr
dec
M
ebr
S
ebr
I
br→ ebr
br→ qr
qr
Fig. 7. Architecture of the extension of the Match-On-Card technology to biometric
identification. The dotted red line indicates the location of the comparison.
n denotes the size of the database (i.e. the number of enrolled users), q
the size of the quantizations, and c the number of indices asked by the card.
The ranges are Range(br, ebr, qr) = n, Range(rd,thr, bs, qs, dec) = 1, and
Range(ind, sebr, sbr) = c. The set Fun of functions contains the extraction
procedure Extract, the encryption and decryption procedures Enc and Dec, the
(non-invertible) quantization Quant of the biometric templates, the comparison
of the quantizations QComp, which takes as inputs two sets of quantizations
and the parameter c, the selection of the encrypted templates EGet, and finally
the matching µ, which takes as arguments two biometric templates and the
threshold thr.
The biometric reference templates are enrolled by the issuer (HasI(br)). A
verification process is initiated by the terminal T receiving as input a raw bio-
metric data rd from the user U. T extracts the fresh biometric template bs from
rd using the function Extract ∈ Fun. The architecture then contains, as other
biometric systems, ReceiveT,U({}, {rd}) and ComputeT(bs = Extract(rd)) and
the DepT relation is such that (bs, {rd}) ∈ DepT. The user receives the final de-
cision dec from the terminal: ReceiveU,T({}, {dec}). To sum up, the architecture
is described as follows in the framework of Section 2:
Ami :=
{
HasI(br), HasU(rd), HasM(c), HasM(thr),
ComputeI(ebr = Enc(br)), ComputeI(qr = Quant(br)),
ComputeT(bs = Extract(rd)), ComputeT(sebr = EGet(ebr, ind)),
ComputeT(qs = Quant(bs)), ComputeM(ind = QComp(qs, qr,c)),
ComputeM(sbr = Dec(sebr)), ComputeM(dec = µ(sbr, bs,thr)),
ReceiveS,I({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}), ReceiveT,U({}, {rd}),
ReceiveT,S({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}), ReceiveM,T({}, {qs}),
ReceiveM,I({AttestI(qr = Quant(br))}, {qr}), ReceiveT,M({}, {ind}),
ReceiveM,T({}, {sebr, bs}), ReceiveT,M({}, {dec}),
T rustT,I, T rustM,I, T rustT,M, V erifyT(AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))),
V erifyT({AttestM(dec = µ(sbr, bs,thr))}),
V erifyM(AttestI(qr = Quant(br))), V erifyT({AttestM(sbr = Dec(ebr))})
}
The issuer encrypts the templates and computes the quantizations, which is ex-
pressed by the dependencies: DepmiI := {(ebr, {br}), (qr, {br})}. The terminal
and module computations are reflected in the dependencies as well: DepmiT :=
{(bs, {rd}), (qs, {bs})}, (sebr, {bs, ind})}. The dependency relation of the
module reflects its ability to decrypt the templates: DepmiM := {(ind, {qs, qr,
c}), (sbr, {sebr}), (dec, {sbr, bs, thr}), (br, {ebr})}. The absence of such
a relation in other dependencies prevents the corresponding components to get
access to the plain references, even if they get access to the ciphertexts.
6.1 Learning from the selected quantizations
Let us now discuss the following point: the formalism of Section 2 is insufficient
to consider the leakage of the sensitive biometric data stored inside the module.
In Ami, we would like that the terminal gets no access to the quantizations:
Ami ∈ HasnoneT (qr). It is indeed possible to derive Ami ` HasnoneT (qr), thanks
to the (HN) rule. According to the notations of [2], where Hasi(X) stands for
Hasi(X
(1)) in this paper, we have:
@X : DepT(qr, X) ∈ Ami
HasT(qr) 6∈ Ami
@j, S : ReceiveT,j(S, {qr}) ∈ Ami
@T : ComputeT(qr = T ) ∈ Ami
A 0 HasT(qr)
HN
A ` HasnoneT (qr)
This corresponds to the intuition saying that quantizations are protected since
they are stored in a secure hardware element.
However, an attack (described in [12]) shows that, in practice, quantizations
can be learned if a sufficient number of queries to the module is allowed. The
attack roughly proceeds as follows (we drop the masks for sake of clarity). The
attacker maintains a n×q table (say T ) of counters for each bit to be guessed. All
entries are initialized to 0. Then it picks q-bits random vector Q and sends it to
the module. The attacker observes the set of indices ind ⊆ [1,n] corresponding
to the encrypted templates asked by the module. It updates its table T as follows,
according to its query Q and the response ind: for each i ∈ [1,n] and j ∈ [1,q],
it decrements the entry T [i][j] if Q[j] = 0, and increments it if Q[j] = 1. At the
end of the attack, the n quantizations are guessed from the signs of the counters.
The number of queries made to the module is the crucial point in the attack
above (and generally in other black-box attacks against biometric systems [12]).
Our extended model enables to introduce a bound on the number of actions
allowed to be performed. We now use this model to integrate such a bound in
the formal architecture description. Let Ami-e(n) be the following architecture,
for some n ≥ 1:
Ami-e(n) :=
{
HasI(br), Has
(n)
U (rd), HasM(c), HasM(thr),
Compute
(n)
I (ebr = Enc(br)), Compute
(n)
I (qr = Quant(br)),
Compute
(n)
T (bs = Extract(rd)), Compute
(n)
T (sebr = EGet(ebr, ind)),
Compute
(n)
T (qs = Quant(bs)), Compute
(n)
M (ind = QComp(qs, qr,c)),
Compute
(n)
M (sbr = Dec(sebr)), Compute
(n)
M (dec = µ(sbr, bs,thr)),
Receive
(n)
S,I ({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}), Receive(n)T,U({}, {rd}),
Receive
(n)
T,S({AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))}, {ebr}), Receive(n)M,T({}, {qs}),
Receive
(n)
M,I({AttestI(qr = Quant(br))}, {qr}), Receive(n)T,M({}, {ind}),
Receive
(n)
M,T({}, {sebr, bs}), Receive(n)T,M({}, {dec}),
T rustT,I, T rustM,I, T rustT,M, V erify
(n)
T (AttestI(ebr = Enc(br))),
V erify
(n)
T ({AttestM(dec = µ(sbr, bs,thr))}),
V erify
(n)
M (AttestI(qr = Quant(br))),
V erify
(n)
T ({AttestM(sbr = Dec(ebr))})
}
In addition to the dependence of Ami, the dependence relations indicates that
the leakage is conditioned by a specific link mapping between the outsourced
ciphertexts and the stored quantizations: Depmi-eT (qr, {ind(n·q), qs(n·q)}). Fur-
thermore, the module may learn the entire database ebr in a number of queries
depending on the size of the database and the number of indices asked by the
module: Depmi-eM (ebr, {sebr(dn/ce)}).
6.2 Strengthened variants of the architecture
Now, based on some counter-measures of the attacks indicated in [12], we express
several variants of the architecture Ami-e. For each variant, the deductive rules
D for the property language LP are used to show that, for some conditions on
the parameters, the quantizations qr are protected.
Variant 1 As a first counter-measure, the module could ask the entire database
at each invocation. It is rather inefficient, and, in some sense, runs against to ini-
tial motivation of its design. However, this can be described within the language
LA, and, in practice, can be manageable for small databases. This architecture,
denoted Ami-e1, is given by Ami-e(n) for some n ≥ 1, except that Depmi-e1T :=
DepmiT . It is now possible to prove that the quantizations are protected, even
in presence of several executions of the protocols. Since the relations DepT no
longer contains a dependence leading to qr, an application of (HN) becomes
possible and gives the expected property.
@X : DepT(qr, X) ∈ Ami-e1
Has
(n)
T (qr) 6∈ Ami-e1
@j : Receive(n)T,j(S, {qr}) ∈ Ami-e1
@T : Compute(n)T (qr = T ) ∈ Ami-e1
∀n : A 0 HasT(qr(n))
HN
A ` HasnoneT (qr)
Variant 2 In the precedent variant, the effect of the counter-measure is the
withdrawal of the dependence relation. We now consider architectures where
such a dependency is still given, but where counter-measures are used to prevent
a critical bound on the number of queries to be reached.
A first measure is to block the number of attempts the terminal can make.
The module can detect it and refuse to respond. This architecture, denoted
Ami-e2, is given by Ami-e(b), for some b n·q. As a result, the Hasnonei (qr) prop-
erty can be derived. In particular one must show that Ami-e2 0 HasT(ind(n·q)),
in order to prevent the dependence rule H5 to be applied.
@S : Receive(b)T,M(S, {ind}) ∈ Ami-e2
Has
(b)
T (ind) ∈ Ami-e2 b < n · q
@T : Compute(b)T (ind = T ) ∈ Ami-e2
Ami-e2 0 HasT(ind(n·q))
An application of HN enables to conclude.
Depmi-e2T (qr, {ind(n·q)}) ∈ Ami-e2
Has
(b)
T (qr) 6∈ Ami-e2
@j : Receive(b)T,j(S, {qr}) ∈ Ami-e2
Ami-e2 0 HasT(ind(n·q)) @T : Compute(b)T (qr = T ) ∈ Ami-e2
Ami-e2 0 HasT(qr(1))
HN
Ami-e2 ` HasnoneT (qr)
Variant 3 In the precedent variant, the terminal cannot accumulate enough
information since he cannot query the module enough times to derive a useful
knowledge. We now describe a variant where the terminal has no bound on the
number of times it asks the module, but where the system is regularly reini-
tialised, so that the accumulated information becomes useless.
The leakage of the system runtime is dependent on some association between
the quantizations qr and the encrypted database ebr; namely the association pi
that maps the quantization qr[i] = Quant(br[pi(i)]) to the encrypted template
from which it has been computed ebr[pi(i)] = Enc(br[pi(i)]). Once this map-
ping is changed, the information is cancelled. For instance the database can be
randomly permuted after b queries to the secure module.
Formally, this is caught by adding a Reset primitive to the architecture. Let
Ami-e3 be the architecture defined as Ami-e3 := Ami-e2 ∪ {Reset}. The semantics
of the Reset events ensures that no more than b values of ind will be gathered
by the terminal for a fixed mapping. The proof that Ami-e3 ` HasnoneT (qr) is as
the proof that Ami-e2 ` HasnoneT (qr).
7 Related works
Generally speaking, while the privacy of biometric data has attracted a lot of at-
tention in the news (for instance, with the introduction of a fingerprint sensor in
the new iphone) and among lawyers and policy makers7, it has not triggered such
a strong interest in the computer science community so far. Most studies in this
area are done on a case by case basis and at a lower level than the architectures
described here. For instance, [42] proposes a security model for biometric-based
authentication taking into account privacy properties – including impersonation
resilience, identity privacy or transaction anonymity – and applies it to biometric
authentication. The underlying proofs rely on cryptographic techniques related
to the ElGamal public key encryption scheme. [26,28,29] develop formal models
from an information theoretic perspective relying on specific representations of
biometric templates close to error correcting codes.
As far as formal approaches to privacy are concerned, two main categories
can be identified: the qualitative approach and the quantitative approach. Most
proposals of the first category rely on a language which can be used to define
systems and to express privacy properties. For example process calculi such as
the applied pi-calculus [1] have been applied to define privacy protocols [13].
Other studies [4,5] involve dedicated privacy languages. The main departure of
the approach advocated in this paper with respect to this trend of work is that
we reason at the level of architectures, providing ways to express properties
without entering into the details of specific protocols. Proposals of the second
category rely on privacy metrics such as k-anonymity, l-diversity, or -differential
privacy [15] which can be seen as ways to measure the level of privacy provided by
an algorithm. Methods [32] have been proposed to design algorithms achieving
7 For example with a proposal adopted by the French Senate in May 2014 to introduce
stronger requirements for the use of biometrics.
privacy metrics or to verify that a system achieves a given level of privacy. These
contributions on privacy metrics are complementary to the work described in
this paper. We follow a qualitative (or logical) approach here, proving that a
given privacy property is met (or not) by an architecture. As suggested in the
next section, an avenue for further research would be to cope with quantitative
reasoning as well, using inference systems to derive properties expressed in terms
of privacy metrics.
Several authors [21,27,33,34,40] have already pointed out the complexity of
“privacy engineering” as well as the “richness of the data space”[21] calling for
the development of more general and systematic methodologies for privacy by
design. [27,31] point out the complexity of the implementation of privacy and
the large number of options that designers have to face. To address this issue and
favour the adoption of these tools, [27] proposes a number of guidelines for the
design of compilers for secure computation and zero-knowledge proofs whereas
[18] provides a language and a compiler to perform computations on private data
by synthesising zero-knowledge protocols. None of these proposals addresses the
architectural level and makes it possible to get a global view of a system and to
reason about its underlying trust assumption.
8 Conclusion
This work is the result of a collaboration between academics, industry and
lawyers to show the applicability of the privacy by design approach to biometric
systems and the benefit of formal methods to this end. Indeed, even if privacy
by design becomes a legal obligation in the European Union [16] its application
to real systems is far from obvious. We have presented in the same formal frame-
work a variety of architectural options for privacy preserving biometric systems.
We also have introduced an extension of this formal framework in order to catch
the leakage due to the system runtime.
One of the main advantages of the approach is to provide formal justifications
for the architectural choices and a rigorous basis for their comparison. Table 1
is a recap chart of the architectures reviewed in the first part of this paper. One
of the most interesting pieces of information is the trust assumptions which are
highlighted by the model. The first line shows that Aed is the architecture in
which the strongest trust in put in the terminal that does not have to trust any
other component apart from the issuer and is able to get access to br. Architec-
ture Ahsm is a variant of Aed; it places less trust in the terminal that has to trust
the hardware security module to perform the matching. Ahom is the architecture
in which the terminal is less trusted: it has to trust the issuer, the hardware
security module and the server for all sensitive operations and its role is limited
to the collection of the fresh biometric trait and the computation of the fresh
template. Architecture Amoc is similar to this respect but all sensitive opera-
tions are gathered into a single component, namely the smart card. It should
be clear that no solution is inherently better than the others and, depending
on the context of deployment and the technology used, some trust assumptions
may be more reasonable than others. In any case, it is of prime importance to
understand the consequences of a particular choice in terms of trust.
Arch. Computations Template protection Trust relations
Components Components
Location of accessing the accessing
the matching references br the query bs
Aed T I, T T (T, I)
Ahsm M I, M T, M (T, I), (T, M)
Ahom S I T (T, I), (T, M), (T, S)
Amoc M M T, M (T, M)
Components are: user U, terminal T, server S, secure module M (used as a generic name for a
hardware security module or a card C), issuer I.
A trust relation (i, j) means that component i trusts component j.
Table 1. Comparison between architectures
A benefit of the formal approach followed in this paper is that it can pro-
vide the foundations for a systematic approach to privacy by design. A proof of
concept implementation of a system to support designers in their task has been
proposed in [3]. In this system, the user can introduce his privacy and integrity
requirements (as well as any requirements imposed by the environment such as
the location of a given operation on a designated component) and choose dif-
ferent options for the distribution of the operations and the trust assumptions.
When an architecture has been built, the system can try to verify the required
properties with or without the help of the designer.
As stated above, we focused on the architectural level. As a result, we do not
cover the full development cycle. Preliminary work has been done to address the
mapping from the architecture level to the protocol level to ensure that a given
implementation, expressed as an applied pi-calculus protocol, is consistent with
an architecture [41]. As far as the formal approach is concerned, it would also
be interesting to study how it could be used in the context of future privacy
certification schemes. This would be especially interesting in the context of the
European General Data Protection Regulation [16] which promotes not only
privacy by design but also privacy seals.
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